My primary research interests lie in metaphysics and philosophy of action. My PhD thesis, being prepared under the supervision of Prof. Helen Steward, defends a non-causal libertarian account of free and rational agency. I construct this account upon a broadly neo-Aristotelian metaphysics, defending a version of realism about powers and holding that all agency, including that exhibited by inanimate objects, consists in the exercise of (ontologically irreducible) powers. I am therefore particularly interested in theories of powers/dispositions, causality, laws, and personhood/mentality, among other areas.


In epistemology, I’m most interested in following Laurence BonJour in defending a moderate form of rationalism, according to which substantive a priori justification is indispensable for all, or nearly all, cases of epistemic justification. This position is foundationalist and internalist, but leaves room for useful externalist and non-foundationalist varieties of justification and knowledge (as bearing a kind of secondary epistemological status).


My views in ethics lie in the direction of a Rossian ethical intuitionism. I am therefore interested in defending a realist position that is deontological and non-naturalist in character, and in working on issues in moral epistemology and moral metaphysics.  I also plan to do occasional work in social and political philosophy Рnamely, in questions having to do with the justification of authority and the state, and with alternative forms of political and economic organization.